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Dec 3, 1. He expected that Germany would not need to outbuild the Royal Navy in order to pose a threat to Britain, since British sea power was committed worldwide. If the Royal Navy accepted a battle with a numerically inferior but modern German fleet, it would probably win, but it would suffer such heavy losses that another sea power -- presumably an ally of Germany or a rival of Britain -- would then be able to destroy the victorious British fleet. Thus Britain would run a risk if it went to war with Germany, and its diplomacy would have to take a more supportive attitude toward German colonial aims.
A comparatively small but efficient German battle fleet concentrated in the North Sea would represent a diplomatic lever and deterrent. Tirpitz assumed that the German ships would be superior to the British vessels and that their crews would be better trained. Was Risk theory flawed in concept, or was it merely flaed in Germany's execution of it?? Would a fully armed German navy, with leaders willing to risk the entire navy in battle, unlike the leaders at Jutland, be able to execute the strategy proposed in Risk Theory, i.
Jul 5, 0 Visit site. I think Tirpitz either developed this theory himself or used the theories of Mahan. Normal military leaders are not willing to risk all their forces in one battle. There may by new enemies or hidden reserves of the present enemy. And what to do when you have destroyed your own force in one battle? The only realistic naval competitor to Britain except for Germany years ago was the US. But the only ones who had a lager inventory was Britain, Germany and the US.
So the realistic answer must be US then, if Germany had destroyed its owns fleet an crippled the Royal Navy. Feb 22, 4. Off Topic? May 4, 1. It sounds pretty divorced from the realities of the time--a sort of "game theory" approach that figured since other nations would benefit by the destruction of the Royal Navy, other nations would logically leap at the chance to do so.
Reallistically, I can't think of a nation that would have done so. Certainly not in WWI. France wasn't going to help out the Germans; Japan, Italy and Spain didn't have the ability, and for geographic reasons it's unlikely the other powers were ever going to devote enough resources to their naval power. So flawed in theory. A better place for this tread would be the post forum. Click to expand I don't believe that Risk Theory was flawed in theory, only in practice. It makes sense that Britain wouldn't attack a fully armed German fleet that was willing to risk its entire force in one battle, as Britain wouldn't have the means to replace all the ships she lost, and Germany wouldn't need to, as she was primarily a land power.
The theory was flawed in practice, as no German could be expected to be such a devotee of Tirpitz's theory that he would be willing to scuttle the entire high seas fleet in one battle, just so some far off revision of world power could occur. The only flaw in the theoritical portion of Risk Theory is that Britain couldn't have been expected to wait for the navy to be built up to full strength before executing a "Copenhagen" type attack on German naval bases.
Therein lies the flaw of Risk Theory. Jan 29, 0 Visit site. While Tirpitz's idea appeals to the strategist in me, I find it unlikely that a nation will risk it's war-making power in the unconfirmed hopes that another country will continue the fight. This is against the basics of sovereignity IMHO!
Tirpitz had a good idea, but one that could never actually be tried. Jutland and the resultant German Naval action for the rest of World War I that is, very very little is the logical result of Tirpitz's theory. The deterrant factor does have merit. Britain did have to consider the potential of the German force, but the Germans only benefitted if it remained potential.
Once engaged, it lost it's power. Shades of global thermonuclear buildup. Great deterrance Jul 30, 1. The Risikoflotte concept was utterly flawed not least because it was directed at the RN. If ever there was a service with an almost unbroken record of aggressiveness, it is the Royal Navy.
It consistently over the course of centuries court-martialed and disposed of its officers who failed to attack even in numerical inferiority. To think that it would bawl at the idea of confronting a weaker navy because it might take losses just shows a complete lack of touch with reality and a very real case of delusion and wishful thinking.
It also shows how much the German navy was disconnected from the army, for the strategic plans of the latter were precisely based on the successive defeat of two armies, the French and Russian, each of which weren't that inferior to the German one.
If the navy's concept had been correct, then the army would have steered away from WWI. As has been pointed out, the "theory" could only be valid if there existed a believable external threat. But if such a threat had been real, then at least some kind of diplomatic feelers would have been sent by either or both parties to coordinate their actions against Britain. Suppose country X had done precisely this.
In this latter case, the Risikoflotte concept of engaging the RN in a situation of inferiority actually plays into the RN's hand, for it grants it an attempt at defeating its ennemies in detail.
Need I say more? However, was the fleet dispatched to protect the home islands as large as the German High Seas Fleet and country X's navy. Correlli Barnett. Battle of the River Plate. London: Allan, Naval Institute Press, The British Admirals of the Fleet — London: Cassell and company, Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischenKrisenstrategie by Volker R. Seaforth Publishing, British Battleships of the Victorian Era. Naval Institution Press, BRILL, D diss. History of the Great War Naval Operations.
Longmans Green and co, The Scapegoat - The life and tragedy of a fighting admiral and Churchill's role in his death. Book Guild Limited, Toggle navigation.
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