Zitate pro Jahr. Doppelte Zitate. Diesem Autor folgen. Neue Artikel von diesem Autor. Neue Zitationen von diesem Autor. Neue Artikel, die mit der Forschung dieses Autors in Zusammenhang stehen. Alle anzeigen. University of La Laguna. ETH Zurich. Calculus of Variations Partial Differential Equations. Journal of Functional Analysis 1 , , We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them.
View 2 excerpts, cites background and methods. Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information. View 1 excerpt, cites background. In this paper, I study the nonparametric identification of a model of price discrimination with multidimensional consumer heterogeneity from disaggregated data on consumers' choices and … Expand. Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions. View 10 excerpts, cites background and results.
Heterogeneous buyers and sellers must make investments before entering a continuum assignment market. I show that efficient ex-post contracting equilibria Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite a exist … Expand. The Economics of Multidimensional Screening. The analysis has been usefully applied to such topics as optimal … Expand. Highly Influential. View 6 excerpts, references methods and background.
A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection. Abstract Considering adverse selection with a continuum of types, a general characterization of implementability in terms of h -convexity is provided. View 14 excerpts, references background and methods. Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening. We provide existence proofs and characterization results for the multidimensional version of the multiproduct monopolist problem of Mussa and Rosen These results are also directly applicable … Expand.
View 10 excerpts, references background and methods. Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. We consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator.
The regulator's objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers' … Expand. View 2 excerpts, references background. Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem.
This paper compares the principal's payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the agent's access to information. The agent may make decisions before is uninformed or after is … Expand.
View 1 excerpt, references background. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context. Abstract The aim of this note is to give a simple characterization of the rationalizability of decision rules or action profiles. The necessary and sufficient condition we obtain suggests … Expand.
View 4 excerpts, references methods and background. Abstract This paper presents an analysis of optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions. An earlier paper on the same topic, Lewis and … Expand. Monopoly with Incomplete Information.
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